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" 
Central Bank Independence and 
Policy Results: Theory and Evidence* 
Alex Cukterman 
The author while discussing on the Stability and Economic 
Growth and the Role of the Central Bank, presents that 
sufficiently high level of Central Bank Independence (CBI) 
is a desirable feature of monetary policymaking institutions. 
This, rather wide, consensus relies on two pillars. One 
theoretical and the other empirical. This author also reviews 
the standard theoretical case for Central Banks Independence 
CBI, some recent extensions, and existing empirical evidence 
on the relation between CBI and economic performance. It 
then makes some remarks on the challenges faced by monetary 
policy in an era of price stability characterized by flexible 
inflation targeting. The primary responsibility of the central 
bank (CB) is to assure price stability and financial stability. 
The bank should have sufficient financial independence. Its 
high officials should have sufficiently long-terms in office, 
and should not hold other positions in government or in the 
private sector in order to prevent conflicts of interest. The 
paper also highlights on existing evidence on the relation 
between CBI and economic performance in the areas of 
inflation, growth, investment, real rates and accommodation. 
ThiS is a lecture prepared for the InternatIonal Conference on "Stablhty and EconomIC Growth The Role of the 
Central Bank", MeXICO City. November 14-15. 2005 
Source wwwtau ac II CO Banco de MexiCO Reprinted wcth permcHlon 
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l1fontemporaneous conventIonal wisdom IS that a sufficiently high level of 
~ Central Bank Independence (CBI) is a desirable feature of monetary 
policymaking institutions. ThIs, rather wide, consensus relies on two pillars. One 
theoretical and the other empIrical. ThIs lecture briefly reviews the standard 
theoretical case for CBl, some recent extensions, and existmg empirical evidence 
on the relanon between CBl and economIC perfOlmance. It then makes some 
remarks on the challenges faced by monetary policy in an era of price stability 
characterized by flexible inflation targeting. 
Before plunging into details it is useful to briefly recall what CBI means and 
how it IS measured. In spite of some contentious issues It is fair to say that 
mdependence as currently understood Involves the folIowmg features The primary 
responsibility of the Central Bank (CB) IS to assure prIce stabIlIty and financial 
stabIlIty. WIthout prejudIce to these objectives the CB should support the 
economic policies of government. To achieve Its main objective the bank should 
have Instrument independence" The bank is prohibited from lending to 
government. 2 The bank should have sufficient financial independence. Its high 
officIals should have suffiCIently long-terms In office, and should not hold other 
poslt1ons in government or III the pnvate sector in order to prevent confhcts of 
Interest. Delegation of authonty to a non elected Institution should be 
accompanied by accountabIlity and transparency. It IS noteworthy that those 
two buzzwords of modern monetary institutions were hardly heard twenty years 
ago or earlier. The absence of independence accountability was unnecessary and, 
as political entities, governments and ministnes of finance had no incentIves to 
raise questions about their own transparency In the conduct of monetary policy. 
Due to its multi~dlmensional nature there is no single compelling measure of 
CBI. Much of the academic literature of the last twenty years has utihzed legal 
characteristics from CB charters to construct aggregate indices of legal 
mdependence. However, since charters normally are highly incomplete contracts, 
actual independence is also affected by numerous more or less formal arrangements 
between governments and the CB. As a consequence, there are normally 
discrepancIes between the legal and the actuallndependence of a CB. The size of 
those discrepancies varies inversely, across countries, with the general respect for 
the law. Since law enforcement is generally tighter in developed than in developing 
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countries, legal indices of Independence provide better proxies for actual 
mdependence m the first than III the second group of countries. In the case of 
developmg countnes behavioral indices of mdependence are, therefore, relattvely 
more Important. Two such indIces are the actual, as opposed to the legally 
mandated, turnover of CB governors and the other known as "the political 
vulnerabIlity of the CB" is the frequency of cases III whIch a political transition is 
followed wlthm a short period of time by a replacement of the CB governor. 
1. The Theoretical Case for CBI 
1.1 The Standard Case 
The, by now, standard case for CBI IS based on the notion chat there IS an mflanon 
bias under discretion. The explanation for thIS bIas is based on a two way 
mteraction between pohcymal{ers and a rational publIc within the context of the 
expectations augmented Phillips curve (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and 
Gordon (1983) - KPBG in the sequel). It IS based on the notion that monetary 
pohcymakers care about both price stabilIty and employment and that their 
preferred level of employment IS higher than the natural level. This is due to 
eIther tax dIstortions (Barro and Gordon (1983» or to the existence of umons 
that create excessive unemployment by mamtaming the real wage above its market 
clearing level (Cuklerman (1992), chapter 3). Under discretion policymakers try 
to create inflatIonary surprises in order to push employment above its natural 
level towards the hIgher deSIred level. But mdividuals understand the temptation 
of policymakers and correctly forecast inflatIOn, neutralizing any effect of inflation 
on employment. As a consequence, employment remains at 1tS natural level but 
monetary policy IS subject to a suboptimal Inflationary bIas. This is the 
well-known dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy under discretion. 
A qualItatively simtlar mechanism operates in New KeyneSian frameworks WIth 
staggered sticky prices when policymakers target a level of output that is larger 
than potential (Clarida) Gali and Gertler (1999)). 
Rogo (1985) proposed to reduce the bias by delegating authority over the 
conduct of monetary policy to a CB that is more conservative than society but 
that is not quite a strict inflatIon targeter.3 As a consequence, although smaller 
some bias remains. Walsh (1995) proposed an optimal contract for central bankers 
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that elimmates the bIas entirely whIle inducing the bank to stabIlize output at 
exactly the right amount and Svensson (I997a) showed that such a contract can 
be Implemented by means of inflation targetmg. Although there are some practical 
problems of Implementation With the opumal contract for central banker's 
approach the mam lesson from this lIterature IS that delegatlon of authority to an 
instrument mdependent CB whose main long-run concern IS pnce stabilIty m 
conjunction WIth a proVISO to make the output target equal to potential (or the 
employment target equal to Its natural level) IS a desirable institutional arrangement. 
ThIS still leaves open to an Important question about what should be done when 
there IS a short-run conflict between achIevmg pnce stabilIty and the potential or 
natural level of output. ThIS question IS bnefly dIscussed In the last sectIOn 
The ratIOnalIzatIon for CBI sketched above IS done withm the context of an 
InflatIon bIas that anses due to an employment motIve for monetary expanslOn. 
ThiS motive is probably the pnmary motive for monetary expansion m developed 
economies characterized by WIde capItal markets In whIch government can borrow 
to finance deficIts WIthout raIsing the cost of borrowmg too much. However, m 
developmg countries with limIted acccess to capItal markets the financing needs 
of government dUrIng deficlt perIods exert powerful pressures to monetize on the 
CB. This "revenue motive" for monetary expanSIOn also leads to a socially mefficient 
mflation bIas (Cukierman (1992), chapter 4). 
Stnct and well-enforced prohIbitions on lendmg by the CB to government -
whIch is one of the components of mdependence dIscussed above - reduce or 
eHmmate this bias.4 SImilar conSIderatIons apply to nommally denominated 
government debt. In the absence of suffiCIent Institutional concern for price 
stabIlIty lenders demand an inflatIOn premIUm whICh leads to higher nominal 
rates. In addltlon, central banks that are less conservative stabIlIze inflation to a 
lesser extent 5 As a consequence the lmpact of exogenous shocks on mflanon IS 
larger and so is mflatIon uncertainty Thls leads to hIgher real as well as nommal 
rates of mterest. 
As of itself, the employment motive for monetary expansion may lead to 
moderate, but not to high, inflations. When high inflation occur they usually are 
due to the revenue motive for monetary expansion. The monetary financing of 
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government expendItures that tnggered the BolIvian hypennflatIOn during the 
first part of the eightIes is an extreme example of such a case. 
1.2 Recent Developments in Low Inflation Countries and the Effects of 
Prudence on the Part of Central Banks 
The inflation bIas result as well as the recommendatIOns for best practice monetary 
pohcymaking Institutions destgned to elimmate it are mvanably made wIthin 
the frameworks III which the loss function of the CB is assumed to be quadrauc.6 
It IS well-known that quadratic loss functlons lead to linear CB reactIOn functions. 
However, recent empIrical work suggests that reactIon functIons often are 
non-lmear and that the character and magmtude of those non-linearitles varies 
across countnes and, over tIme, even wIthm a gIven country. In particular, when 
the CB is more concerned with negatlve than WIth positive output gaps ItS policy 
reaction to negative gaps is stronger than to posItive gaps.7 In the presence of 
uncertainty about the state of the economy thIs type of reactlOn leads to an 
mflatton bias even If the CB IS mstructed to hit potentIal output on average 
(Cuklerman (2002), sectIOn IV). Essenttally the bias IS due to the eXIstence of a 
precautIOnary demand for expansIOns on the part of central banks that are uncertain 
about the precise state of the economy. Although thiS bias IS smaller than the one 
created when the CB also attempts to hit a level of output above potentIal It may 
become a problem dunng penods of substantial negative supply shocks. Thus, 
instructmg the CB to aim at potential output on average does not fully eltminate 
mflationary temptatIOns. 8 Ruge-Murcla (2003) finds that thiS type of bias fits 
the history of mflatIon m the US better than the conventional KPBG story. Usmg 
cross-sectional data Cuklerman and Gerlach (2003) find eVIdence of a similar 
"precautionary" bIaS for the central banks of OEeD countries. 
Interestmgly, prudence IS not always confined to the output gap. During 
perIods of dlsmflatlOn, when the CB is anxlOUS to build credibility it may be 
more sensitIve to upward than to downward deVIatIOnS of mflation from its target. 
For example, durmg theIr periods of dIsinflation both the Bank of Israel and the 
Bank of England missed the inflatlOn target more often from below than from 
above. For a gJVen level of credibIlIty such a precaunonary demand for price 
stabIlIty leads to poliCIes that are overly restnctive on average. As a theoretical 
matter the precautionary demand for expanSIOns and the precautIonary demand 
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for price stability tend to offset each other. The first creates an average inflatIOn 
bias while the second creates an average deflation bias. There is evidence that 
during the stabilization of inflation In both the US and the UK the second bias 
dommated. However once Inflation had been stabIlized for some time the 
precautionary demand for expansions became dominant reigniting the risk of an 
average inflation bias (Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003». 
2. CBI and Economic Performance 
ThIS subsection briefly surveys eXIsting evidence on the relatIOn between CBr 
and economIC performance in the areas of lllflatlOn, growth, investment, real 
rates and accommodation. 
2.1 Inflation 
The early evidence ill AieSllla and Summers (1993), GrillI, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992, ch. 19) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
(1992) suggests that, for the mdustnal economIes, inflatIon and legal 
independence are negatively related. By contrast in the group of developing 
countries neither inflation, nor growth are related to legal independence. This is 
most likely due to the fact that, at least till the early nineties there was hardly any 
ltnk between actual and legal independence withm this group of countries. When 
behavlOrally oriented proxies of independence hke the actual turnover of CB 
governors and the index of poltncal vulnerability are used, a negative relation 
between inflation and independence emerges wIthin the group of developing 
countries as well (Cukierman (1992, ch. 19)' Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 
(1992) and Cukierman and Webb (1995)). 
Using data on the legal independence of freshly created central banks in former 
socialist economIes (FSE) during the nineties, and controlling for cumulative 
lIberalization, pnce decontrols and wars, Cukierman, MIller and Neyapti (2002) 
find no relation between mflatIon and legal independence during the initial stages 
of lIberalization. However, once the process of privatization and liberalizatIon of 
domestic prices and of foreign trade becomes sufficiently large and sustained, a 
negative relation between inflatIon and legal independence does emerge. A pOSSIble 
reason is that legal mdependence IS enforced in practice only when the shift to a 
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market economy has become sufficiently important to mduce the authonties to 
serIously engage m law enforcement 
For the Latm American and Canbbean countries dunng the ninetles, and 
controlhng for international mflation, bankmg crises and the exchange rate regime, 
Jacome and Vazquez (2005) find a negatIve relation between inflation and legal 
mdependence. For a sImIlar group of countnes and time period Gutierrez (2003) 
finds that countnes that entrench the legal independence of the CB m the 
constitution have lower mflatIOn than those that do not. 
Is there a general lesson from those dtfferent emptrical InVestIgatIOns? The 
eVIdence IS consistent wIth the conclusion that mflation and actual CBI are 
negatively related m both developed and developing countries. But the extent to 
which thIS basIC relatIOn IS also reflected as a negative relatIOn between inflation 
and legal mdependence depends on several other factors lIke regard for the law 
and the degree of commitment to eBI as proxled, znter altas, by whether or not 
the CB charter is entrenched m the conStitutIOn. 
One may argue that the negatIve relation between mdependence and inflation 
arIses because of reverse causalIty from mflatIOn to mdependence rather than 
from independence to mflation. It is hard to resolve this important question on 
the baSIS of existmg eVIdence. Using data on legal mdependence for the Latm 
Amencan and Caribbean countrIes during the nlOeties Jacome and Vazquez (2005) 
do not find eVIdence to support causality from legal mdependence to mflation. 
But for earher periods Cukierman (1992, ch. 20, sectIOn 7), using governor's 
turnover as a proxy for actual (lack of) independence, finds eVIdence III favor of 
two ways causalIty between turnover and mflatIon. My own gut feeling is that, 
in many cases, causality operates in both directIons. 
2.2 Growth and Investment 
For developed economies Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellmi (1991) found that 
real growth and eBI are unrelated. This led them to label CBI a "fr~ lunch". 
Those results are corroborated III studies by Alesma and Summers (1993) and 
Cukierman, Kalaltzldakls, Summers and Webb (1993). 
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For developing economIes the last paper finds that, although there IS no 
assocIation between legal mdependence and the rate of growth of per capita mcome, 
the associatIOn between growth and actual independence as proxied by the polltlcal 
vulnerability of the CB and related measures of turnover has a positive impact on 
the rate of growth More precisely, using data from the sixties to the eighties and 
controllmg, mter altas, for InItial GDp, the change in terms of trade, initial primary 
and secondary enrollment ratIOs, It 15 found that higher polttical vulnerablltty of 
the CB governor and related measures of turnover are negatively assocIated With 
per capIta growth. 
For a subset of developmg countries Cukierman et at, (1993) also find, III 
some cases, a simIlar negatIve Impact of turnover on the share of investment III 
GDP A possible Joint InterpretatIon of the last two results is that, under dependent 
central bankers, pnvate Investments are lower reducmg the long-run rate of growth. 
2.3 The Distribution of Nominal and Real Rates of Interest 
Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukterman et at, (I993) find that, in developed 
economies the variabiltty of both nommaI and real rates of interest is negatively 
associated with legal independence. The second paper also finds, for the decade 
of the eighties, that the average real return to depOSItors was hlgher in developed 
economies with higher levels of legal mdependence. 
For developmg countrIes Cukierman et al, (I993) find that the vanability of 
both nominal and real deposlt rates of interest is pOSItiVely assocIated with the 
turnover of CB governors. 
The broad conclUSIOn from those findmg IS that the variabilltles of both real 
and nominal rates of interest are lower, and that the average real return to depositors 
IS hIgher, in countries with hIgher levels of actual mdependence. 
2.4 Accommodation of Wage Increases 
Evidence presented in Cuklerman, Rodriguez and Webb (1998) for the penod 
between the sixties and the eIghties suggests that central banks of industrial 
economies With higher levels of legal mdependence accommodate nom mal wage 
mcreases to a lesser extent. This result is obtamed in two stages. First, an over 
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time regressIOn of the rate of Increase In high powered money on the rate of 
Increase of nomInal wages, controllmg for the phase of the cycle and several other 
vanables, IS run for each country The t statistics of the coefficients of the rates of 
Increase In wages from the country regressIOns are then taken as proxies for the 
degree of accommodatIOn and related, cross-sectionally, to the levels of legal 
mdependence.9 ThIS second stage regreSSIOn YIelds a negative association between 
the SIgnIficance adjusted coeffiCIents of accommodation and legal Independence. 
ThIS findIng IS consistent with Rogo's (1985) theory that more effectively 
conservative, or Independent, central banks accommodate wage Increases to a 
lesser exten t. 
3. Two Remarks on the Conduct of Monetary Policy Wlder Flexible 
Inflation Targeting 
Once pnce stability has been achIeved and maintained for a suffiCIently long 
period of time there is a natural tendency on the part of the publIc and of 
pohcymakers to expect that, In addltlon to providIng a long-run stable nominal 
anchor, monetary polIcy WIll be utilized to stabIlIze economic aCtiVIty. In addition 
to being understandable psychologIcally, such expectation IS pOlllted in a right 
dIrectIOn since, following a suffiCIently long penod of low and stable mflatlOn, 
mflationary expectations are lIkely to be relatIvely msensltIve to temporary deviations 
of inflation from its target making the preannounced target relatively credIble. In 
the extreme case of a perfectly credIble target inflationary expectatIons are completely 
insensitIve to deVIatIons of mflation from the target leaving substantial leeway for 
monetary policy to engage III stabIlIzation of the real economy. 
FleXIble inflation targeting as currently practiced by about two dozens central 
banks IS an lllstltutional device that cashes in on the benefits assocIated with 
hIgh credibility.1O Under "best practice" flexible Inflation targetmg as Illustrated, 
mter aitas, by the recent monetary strategy of the Bank of England, It IS explIcitly 
stated that the Bank alms at achIevmg the Inflation target only after two years. 
The poltcy freedom afforded by this deVIce IS used to stabtlize economic aCtiVIty. 
A target that IS intended to be achIeved only withm two years is rationalIzed by 
the argument that, due to lags between policy and economIC outcomes current 
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pohcy wIll affect inflation only after two years from the present. The Bank of 
England makes substantial efforts to be transparent about the path of inflatIOn 
on the way to the target as well as about the associated uncertaintIes by pubhshmg 
mflation reports that contain inflation projectIons and fan charts. 
Although there are substantIal ments to such a systematic and transparent 
approach to the 1mplementation of monetary pohcy it IS important to stress that 
mflatIon targeting leaves some unresolved Issues and that not all the details of the 
Bank of England mflation targeting framework are appropriate for other countnes. 
In particular, central banks of countnes wIth a long hIstory of high and varIable 
mflatIOn like many LatIn AmerIcan countrIes and Israel cannot safely assume 
that Inflationary expectations will remaIn Insensitive to actual mflationary 
developments for the same period of time that they remain insensItive to such 
developments III a country hke the UK that has never experIenced high inflatIOn 
for a substantIal penod of tIme. Since price setters react to changes In expectations 
it is very likely that, ill such countries, monetary pohcy affects mflation WIth a 
lag that is substantially shorter than two years. ThIS lag, most likely, becomes 
even shorter the more expanSIOnary IS fiscal policy. The more general point is that 
the degree of fleXibIlity in targeting mflatlOn IS constrained by the speed with 
which credIbIlity is lost when inflation IS allowed to be above the target for some 
time. This speed depends, In turn, on the long-term memories of nominal 
mstabilty that the publIc has II Smce those memories vary with the mflatlOnary 
history of a country, the trade off between economIC aCtIVIty dIffers across countrIes. 
Consequently the appropnate degree of fleXIbIlIty In targeting mflation vanes across 
countnes and It may even vary wlthm the same country across broad tIme periods.12 
A second open Issue concerns the output target. «Best practice" inflation 
targeters are expected to be transparent. 13 To be transparent fleXIble inflation 
targeters have to be as explIcit as pOSSIble about their output target. The output 
target that most well-tramed economIsts would rally around IS potennal output 
Unfortunately, even for state of the art mflatIon targeters, there IS substantial 
murkmess about potential output. This is largely due to the fact that economics 
as a profession has not yet developed a dear and uncontroversial way of measuring 
potentIal output. In partIcular, there appears to be no connection between the 
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smooth approximatlOnS of potential output used by many central banks and the 
conceptualization of potentIal output as a flexIble pnce and wage equilibrium 
(Woodford 2003) Chapter 6). Empincal proxies of potential output are smooth 
verSIons of actual output whereas the flexIble pnce and wage eqUIlIbnum IS often 
more volanle than actual output Implying that central banks should, 1fl such 
cases, destabiltze rather than stabilIze output. It is lIkely that the set of central 
banks that suscnbe to such polIcIes is currently empty. 14 The more general 
conclusion IS that the current state of economics as a SCIence induces quite a bit 
of murkmess about potential output 
Last but not least. the mherent non measurabIltty of potentIal output leads to 
a related problem when mflatlon targetIng IS flexible. Dunng perIOds of unusually 
large changes In potennal output even state of the art flexIble inflanon targeters 
are led to choose POhCle5 that are Judged. wIth the benefit of hindsights, to have 
led to persistent and substantial polrcy errors. Orphanides (2001) documents such 
errors for the US dunng the seventies and argues convincingly that a non-negligible 
part of the inflation of the seventies and its persistence were due to a large and 
persistent reduction In potential output that was recognized only very gradually 
later on. Cukterman and LippI (2005) show theoretIcally that m the face of large 
permanent shocks to potential output) even a flexible mflation targeter that utilizes 
state of the art techniques lIke optimal filtermg and dynamic opnmization cannot 
aVOld large and persistent retrospective polley errors. IS GIven the stochastic 
structure of shocks and the transmISSIon mechamsm It IS possible to find a degree 
of flexibIltty III targetIng lllflation that eltminates any difference between the 
Interest rate chosen by the CB and the one that elImmates expost poltey errors. 
However, since this degree of flexibIlity does not necessanly correspond to the 
one desued by SOCIety it IS not necessarily SOCIally optimal to adopt it. The weaker 
but more general conclusion IS that the degree of flexibilIty III targenng inflatIon 
should also take the Impact of thiS parameter on welfare through itS impact on 
the filtering problem solved by the CB. 
(Alex Cukterman is a Researcher from Tel-Avtv and Prznceton Untversttzes) 
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Endnotes 
1 In a few cases hke the ECB and the Banco Central de Chile, the bank IS even gwen some 
limIted goal mdependence m the sense that It IS free to determme Its own mflation target 
2 Although t1us prohIbmon legally appltes to the bank It really IS a devlCe fm allowmg the bank 
to resIst governmental pressures to help finance budgetary defiCIts 
3 A stnct lllflatIon targeter (or an ultra conservatIve CB) IS a bank that cares only about the 
stabIhzatlon of mflatIon around ItS target Rogo did not go all the way to proposmg strict 
mflatlOn targetmg m order to leave room for stabIlizatiOn of economIC aCtiVity 
4 U nhke the employment motive, whIch generates a bIas that IS pure waste from a SOClal pomt of 
VIew, monetizatIOn due to the revenue motive IS usefulm that It proVIdes financmg to 
government through seIgnorage But there still IS a dynamIC InCOnSIstency problem that leads 
to a SOCIally mfenor equIlIbnum 
5 Although related mdependence and conservativeness are not quite the same. Independence 
refers to the ability of the bank to implement the pohcles It deSIres WIthout polltlcal 
mterferences. Conservativeness refers to the Importance that the bank assIgns to pnce stabtluy 
m companson to real objectIVes lIke hIgh levels of economIC aCtiVIty and of seignorage 
ObVIOusly, effectIve conservativeness, that determInes polICY choICes, depends both on the 
bank's conservativeness, as well as on Its mdependence For sImphclty I use the terms 
conservatIveness and mdependence mterchanganbly to mean "effective conservativeness" 
6 Examples are Taylor (1999) and Loyaza and Schmldt-Hebbel (2002) 
7 Bhnder (1998, pp. 19, 20) IS among the first to proVIde anecdotal evIdence for thlS. Mter a 
perIod as VIce chaIrman of the Fed he wntes ". m most SItuatIOns the CB wIll take far more 
pohtlcal heat when It tIghtens preemptIvely to aVOId hIgher mflation than when it eases 
preemptively to aVOId higher unemployment". 
8 ConventIOnal WIsdom appears to be that such Instruction should suffice For example 
Svensson (2003, p 426) states that stablhzmg mflatlon around a low average With some 
concern for stabIlIZIng output around potennalls nothmg more than the definltlon of good 
monetalY pohcy 
9 The t statistics of the coeffiCIents rather than the coe dents are unltzed m order to reflect 
the magmrude, as well as the slgmficance of each coeffiCIent 10 the second stage cross 
sectIonal regreSSIOn. 
lOA fleXible mflatIOn targeter is concerned WIth both the deVIatIon of mflatlon from ItS target as 
well as WIth the deVIatIOn of output from Its target By contrast a Strict Inflatlon targeter cares 
only about the first deVIatIon ThIS termmology was mtroduced by Svensson (1997b) 
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Although most central banks do not categonze themselves explIcItly as flexible mflatIon 
targeters most of them act as If they were fleXible ramer than stnct mflatIon targeters (Clanda 
and GerrIer (I 997), Clanda, Gall and Gertler (1998» 
11 It also, most lIkely, depends on the stance of fiscal pohey 
12 An elaboration of thIS prmClple appears m Culuerman (2004). 
13 A dlscusslOn of the vanous aspects and benefits of transparency appears m Geraats (2002) 
14 Further detail about this tenslOn between theory and practice appears m Cukierman (2005). 
1 5 From a statistical pom t of VIew thIS IS due to the fact that potential output IS a latent vanable 
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